Gerrymandering and fair districting in parallel voting systems by Mandric, Igor et al.
Gerrymandering and fair districting in parallel
voting systems
Igor Mandric1, Igor Roşca2, and Radu Buzatu3
1Department of Computer Science, University of California Los
Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, USA
2Institute of Ecology and Geography, Chişinaˇu, Moldova
3Department of Mathematics, Moldova State University, Chişinaˇu,
Moldova
Abstract
Switching from one electoral system to another one is frequently criticized
by the opposition and is viewed as a means for the ruling party to stay in
power. In particular, when the new electoral system is a parallel voting (or a
single-member district) system, the ruling party is usually suspected of a bi-
ased way of partitioning the state into electoral districts such that based on a
priori knowledge it has more chances to win in a maximum possible number of
districts. In this paper, we propose a new methodology for deciding whether a
particular party benefits from a given districting map under a parallel voting
system. As a part of our methodology, we formulate and solve several gerry-
mandering problems. We showcased the application of our approach to the
Moldovan parliamentary elections of 2019. Our results suggest that contrary
to the arguments of previous studies, there is no clear evidence to consider
that the districting map used in those elections was unfair.
1 Introduction
Political (re-)districting represents the task of partitioning a geographic area (e.g., a
state or an administrative unit) into a given number of electoral districts subject to a
predefined set of requirements [1]. Frequently, the requirements are formulated with
respect to demographic and/or geographic peculiarities of the area [2]. For example,
natural demographic requirements may refer to an approximately equal number of
registered voters in each district. A common-sense geographical requirement is the
contiguity and compactness of the districts [2, 3]. In a democratic state, the main
goal of political (re-)districting is creating an unbiased partitioning of the territory
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such that none of the political players benefit from it. If the opposite happens, then
such a situation is commonly referred to as (partisan) gerrymandering.
The problem of political (re-)districting arose at the beginning of the nineteenth
century in Massachusetts elections when a salamander-shaped district was proposed
[4]. Such an “unnatural” district shape was evidence that the legislature attempted
to influence the electoral outcome by manipulating the districts’ borders. The term
“gerrymandering” originates from the name of the famous Massachusetts governor
at that time, Elbridge Gerry. Since then, there were multiple cases in history when
gerrymandering was detected in the elections across many countries in the world
[5, 6, 7, 8]. A lot of effort has been made by the researchers to develop methods for
the detection, quantification, and prevention of gerrymandering [4, 9, 10, 11]. One
of the standard ways for the prevention of gerrymandering is avoiding the creation
of salamander or eel-like shapes by optimizing the compactness of the districts.
For example, one of the earliest methods formulated in the seminal paper of Hess
in the 1960s used a computational model that sought to optimize the moment of
inertia of the districts [12]. However, at that time it was not possible to use it in
practice because there were no computers able to handle it. Since then, several
computational models for solving the political (re-)districting problem have been
proposed [13, 14]. Due to the fact that this problem in many of its formulations is
NP-hard [15], not only exact [16, 17, 18] but also a lot of heuristic-based methods
[19, 20, 21] for tackling it were developed.
In this paper, we propose a novel methodology for detecting gerrymandering
and determining a fair (re-)districting in parallel voting systems. As a part of
our methodology, we formulate and solve two mathematical problems. The first
problem consists of finding a political (re-)districting that maximizes (minimizes)
the number of single-member districts won by a particular party and the second
problem is finding a (re-)districting map with a specified electoral outcome. Finally,
we applied our model to the case of the parliamentary elections held in the Republic
of Moldova under the parallel voting system in 2019 to identify the political force
with the highest benefit from the actual districting and drawing an example of a
fair single-member district map.
2 Background and motivation
Parliamentary (assembly) elections are a process of selecting representatives in the
main legislative body of government in a state. The two most frequently used elec-
toral systems are party-list proportional representation and parallel voting (mixed)
systems. In the family of party-list proportional representation systems, parties
make lists of candidates, and the seats get distributed to each party proportionally
to the number of votes received in the elections. Such systems are used, for exam-
ple, in Argentina, Brazil, Finland, Poland, and Spain. Parallel voting systems differ
from party-list proportional representation systems in that a part of the seats in a
parliament are filled as the result of a single-member district election. Such systems
are used in Russia, Hungary, Japan, and South Korea.
Interestingly, switching from a party-list proportional representation system to
a parallel voting system can be viewed as a means of obtaining more seats in the
parliament by the ruling party in the next elections (especially when its rating is
constantly decreasing). One aspect of such accusations is that the ruling party
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may influence the process of drawing the districting map in a way that favors its
electoral outcome. An example of such switching happened in Moldova in the 2019
parliamentary elections. The party at power (Democratic Party of Moldova) was
accused by the opposition and the civil society of the non-transparent process of
drawing the districting map. The democrats were suspected of gerrymandering,
and several studies claimed that they detected gerrymandering in those elections
(for example, [22]). The main argument in favor of that claim was based on the
fact that the Democrats received more seats in the single-member district elections
than the number of seats they received in the nation-wide constituency with the
proportional system. Such an approach for detecting gerrymandering is wrong since
it does not take into account the geographical distribution of the voters’ preferences
(i.e., the demography of the country). Likewise, without taking into account this
distribution it is not possible to construct a fair districting.
Detecting gerrymandering in an unbiased and demographically-aware way re-
quires the comparison of the actual districting used in the elections with all the
other possible ways to partition the state into single-member districts. Generat-
ing all possible districting maps is a computationally unfeasible task even for such
a small country as the Republic of Moldova. Therefore, computational methods
allowing to efficiently dissect the search space of all possible districting maps are
critical for understanding whether a particular districting map is fair or favoring a
selected political party.
3 Methods
3.1 Projecting the results of the nation-wide constituency
onto the actual districting
Consider a country with a party-list proportional representation electoral system
that is going to transition to a parallel voting system. Given a set of rules R
specifying how the territory of the state is supposed to be partitioned into electoral
districts, one may draw the electoral districts in multiple ways. Let P(R) be the
set of all such electoral partitions. Different partitions p1, p2 ∈ P(R) may not be
equivalent for a particular party. For example, based on a priori voting preferences
of the population in different regions of the country (for example, based on the
results of the previous elections), partition p1 may be more favorable for this party
than partition p2.
We postulate that a priori each citizen votes for the same party both in the
nation-wide constituency and in the local district (we refer to this as the voting
postulate). This means that without knowing the candidates representing each party,
none of the voters has the interest to vote for a candidate of another party. Note that
in practice, when the candidates are known, some citizens may switch their voting
preference in the local districts in favor of a more notorious candidate representing
another party.
Given the actual districting pactual ∈ P(R), one can use the voting postulate
to estimate the results of the single-district elections by projecting the results of
the nation-wide constituency onto the partition pactual. To detect gerrymandering,
one has to enumerate all possible partitions in P(R) to determine the range of the
possible number of seats each party can win in the single-district elections. If a
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party wins under pactual a number of seats close to its maximum value across all the
partitions, then this might be an indication of gerrymandering.
3.2 Detecting gerrymandering and drawing a fair districting
map
A theoretically attractive approach consisting of enumerating all the partitions in
P(R) is not feasible in practice. Various attempts have been made to develop simula-
tion methods allowing the generation of all possible districting maps [23, 24, 25, 26].
Since generating all districting maps is extremely challenging, all efforts in this di-
rection have been successful only for relatively small states. Such models didn’t offer
the possibility to generate sufficiently informative and random partitions at the state
level within a reasonable time. For example, the well-known 538 Gerrymandering
Project [27] uses 2568 districting maps drawn by hand to detect gerrymandering
in the United States. This methodology is tedious and unreliable because a small
sample of districting maps can not provide an adequate snapshot of all possible dis-
tricting partitions. Furthermore, gerrymandering is not a probabilistic process and
if a party influenced the process of drawing the districting map it would rather use
an optimization technique to determine the most favorable one for itself instead of
randomly sampling from P(R).
We consider that two different partitions p1, p2 ∈ P(R) are equivalent if under
the voting postulate they yield the same electoral outcome in the single-member
district elections. We define an electoral outcome as a tuple o = (o1, ..., om, ..., oM)
where om is the number of seats won by party m and the sum of all om across the
M parties is equal to the number of single-member districts K. We denote by O∗
the set of all possible outcomes and by O the set of all feasible outcomes. Note that
for an outcome o to be feasible, at least one partition with outcome o must exist in
P(R).
Let Om be the sorted list of the number of seats party m wins in the single-
member district elections under all feasible outcomes in O. We define the efficiency
score em(o) of party m in electoral outcome o ∈ O as the average percentile score of
om in Om:
em(o) =
∑
k∈LOm (om)
k − 0.5
N × l × 100% (1)
where LOm(om) is the set of all indexes of om in list Om, l = |LOm(om)|, and N
is the overall size of Om. The intuitive interpretation of the efficiency score is the
following: if under some partition p ∈ P(R) party m wins its minimal number of
districts then its efficiency score is 0, and if it wins its maximal number of districts
then its efficiency score is 100.
Enumerating the elements of O is a less challenging problem than enumerating
all the partitions in P(R). To do so, we need to find the minimum ominm and the
maximum omaxm number of seats for each party m and then find all the tuples o for
which ominm ≤ om ≤ omaxm , m = 1, 2, ...,M and
M∑
m=1
om = K and for which at least one
partition in P(R) exists. However, computing ominm and omaxm is not a trivial task.
We refer to the problem of computing omaxm (ominm ) as the Maximum (Minimum)
Gerrymandering Problem. Proving the feasibility of an outcome o ∈ O is also a
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challenging task. We refer to this problem as the Fixed Gerrymandering Problem.
In Section 4 we formulate and solve these problems.
We define an absolutely fair partition as a partition for which the efficiency score
of each party is equal to 50. An absolutely fair partition provides no advantage
to any party in the single-member district elections. An absolutely fair partition
might not necessarily be feasible. A fair partition, denoted pfair, is such a partition
for which its efficiency profile is closest to the efficiency profile of an absolutely fair
partition (in L1 sense), i.e. pfair is a partition for which the electoral outcome ofair
is equal to
argmin
o∈O
M∑
m=1
|em(o)− 50|
Thus, deciding whether a particular partition p ∈ P(R) is fair or biased towards
a particular party can be done with the following procedure:
1. For each party m, solve the Minimum and the Maximum Gerrymandering
Problems to identify the minimum ominm and the maximum omaxm possible num-
ber of seats won by m in the single-member district elections.
2. Identify the set of all potentially possible outcomes O∗.
3. For each o∗ ∈ O∗, solve Fixed Gerrymandering Problem to find out whether
o∗ is feasible. Select only the set of feasible outcomes O.
4. For each outcome o ∈ O, compute the efficiency score of each party m and the
L1 distance between the efficiency profile corresponding to o and the efficiency
profile of the outcome corresponding to an absolutely fair partition.
5. Sort the set of feasible outcomes O by the distances computed in step 4. If
the outcome corresponding to p is in the top 5% of outcomes closest to the
absolutely fair one then there is no evidence of gerrymandering and partition p
yields a relatively fair districting map. Otherwise, the party with the highest
efficiency score can be suspected of gerrymandering.
4 Gerrymandering problems
4.1 Minimum and Maximum Gerrymandering Problems
In a single-member district system, party m wins an electoral district if it accumu-
lates more votes than any other participating party. As a result of winning elections
in a district, party m receives a seat in the parliament. The goal of each party is to
maximize its number of seats. Having full control over the process of partitioning the
state into a set of electoral districts, party m would adopt a partition pm ∈ P(R)
which would fully advantage its electoral outcome. Therefore, it would solve the
following:
Maximum Gerrymandering Problem. The state consists of N localities. Each
locality i, i = 1, N is characterized by the total number of registered voters pi.
M political parties participate in the elections with K electoral districts under a
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parallel voting system. Given vmi , the number of votes party m, m = 1,M wins
in the locality i, i = 1, N , determine a partition pm ∈ P(R) of the state into K
electoral districts such that party m wins the maximum possible number of districts.
The set of rules R is:
• The centers of the K districts are predefined (the center of the district k is
denoted as Ck, k = 1, K). These centers are, for example, the largest localities
in the country;
• The K districts must be geographically contiguous, i.e, there should exist a
path between any two localities in the district, two localities being neighbors
if and only if they share a border;
• The number of registered voters in each district should not be less than A and
not more than B.
Solutions of the Maximum Gerrymandering Problem (it is possible to have mul-
tiple solutions with the same value of the objective function) yield the upper bound
on the number of won districts due to gerrymandering. To obtain the lower bound,
one has to solve the Minimum Gerrymandering Problem. We will refer to these
problems as Max-GP (similarly, Min-GP).
4.2 Fixed Gerrymandering Problem
Proving that a particular electoral outcome o ∈ O∗ is feasible can be done by giving
an example of a partition p ∈ P(R) yielding o. In other words, one has to solve the
following
Fixed Gerrymandering Problem. Given the setup of Max-GP (or Min-GP),
determine if there exists at least one partition p ∈ P(R) yielding o.
In the next section, we propose an integer linear programming (ILP) approach
for solving min-GP (max-GP) and fixed-GP.
4.3 Integer Linear Programming approach
We view the localities of the state as the nodes V of an undirected graph G = (V,E).
Two nodes i and j are connected by an edge eij ∈ E if and only if the two localities
i and j are geographically adjacent, i.e. share a border. We will refer to G as
geographical adjacency graph. We introduce binary variables uik with the following
meaning:
uik =
{
1, if locality i is assigned to district k
0, otherwise.
(2)
Each locality is assigned to exactly one district. This can be described by the
following equation:
K∑
k=1
uik = 1, i = 1, N (3)
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To guarantee that each district is contiguous, i.e. subgraph Gk induced by the
localities assigned to district k is connected, we use the following flow formulations.
For each edge eij ∈ E and for each district k, we introduce integer-valued non-
negative flow variables Fijk, i, j = 1, N, k = 1, K. We also introduce two additional
vertices s and t to the graph G - the source and the sink. The variables Fijk must
satisfy multiple conditions. First of all, they should be bounded by a large enough
number L:
Fijk ≤ L, eij ∈ E, i, j = 1, N, k = 1, K. (4)
The flow from source s to the nodes of subgraph Gk propagates from s only to
the center Ck of district k and it is equal to the number of localities assigned to
district k. This can be described by the following two conditions:
Fsik = 0, k = 1, K, i = 1, N, i 6= Ck (5)
and
N∑
i=1
Fsik =
N∑
i=1
uik, k = 1, K (6)
The flow from sink t to all the nodes of graph G is 0:
Ftik = 0, i = 1, N, k = 1, K (7)
For each subgraph Gk, the total flow which goes to sink t is also equal to the
number of localities assigned to district k:
N∑
i=1
Fitk =
N∑
i=1
uik, k = 1, K (8)
At each node, the conservation of flow must be satisfied:
Fsik +
N∑
j=1
Fjik = Fitk +
N∑
j=1
Fijk, i = 1, N, k = 1, K (9)
Next, if an edge eij ∈ E connects two localities assigned to different districts
then the flow Fijk through this edge in district k is null. This is described by the
following two conditions:
Fijk ≤ L · uik, eij ∈ E, i, j = 1, N, k = 1, K (10)
and
Fijk ≤ L · ujk, eij ∈ E, i, j = 1, N, k = 1, K (11)
The requirement that the total number of registered voters of district i is ranged
between A and B is described by the following restrictions:
N∑
i=1
diuik ≥ A, k = 1, K (12)
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and
N∑
i=1
diuik ≤ B, k = 1, K (13)
where di is the number of registered voters in locality i.
Party m dominates another party m′ in district k if m accumulates a strictly
greater number of votes than m′ in district k. We introduce binary variables wmm′k
with the following meaning:
wmm′k =
{
1, if party m dominates party m′ in district k
0, otherwise.
(14)
The domination of partym over partym′ (i.e., when partym accumulates strictly
more votes than party m′) in district k can be described by the following conditions:
N∑
i=1
vmi uik ≥
N∑
i=1
vm
′
i uik + 1− L · (1− wmm′k), (15)
and
N∑
i=1
vm
′
i uik ≥
N∑
i=1
vmi uik − L · wmm′k, (16)
where k = 1, K, m,m′ = 1,M, m 6= m′.
Party m wins in district k if and only if it dominates all other parties m′, m′ =
1,M, m′ 6= m in district k. This can be expressed by the following two conditions:
wmm′k ≥ wmk , m,m′ = 1,M, m 6= m′, k = 1, K (17)
and
M∑
m′=1
m′ 6=m
wmm′k ≤ wmk +M − 2, m = 1,M, k = 1, K (18)
where
wmk =
{
1, if party m wins in district k
0, otherwise.
(19)
The objective function for max-GP and min-GP is:
K∑
k=1
wmk → max (min) (20)
For solving fixed-GP, we introduce additional constraints:
K∑
k=1
wmk = om, m = 1,M (21)
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and the objective function is a constant (since we are searching for a feasible
solution).
5 Case study: Moldova parliamentary elections 2019
In this section, we applied our method to determine the party for which the actual
partition of the state into single-member districts was most favorable in Moldovan
parliamentary elections which took place in February 2019 under the parallel voting
system. We also found a fair districting and determine whether the actual districting
can be considered fair.
5.1 The electoral system of Moldova
Before 2019, the 101 members of Parliament were elected by party-list proportional
representation system. After a reform of the electoral system, the elections in 2019
were held under the parallel voting system. Each citizen was supposed to vote twice
- once for a party in the nation-wide constituency and once for a candidate (either a
representative of a party or an independent candidate) in his/her local district. The
elections in the nation-wide constituency accounted for 50 seats in the Parliament
and the single-member district elections accounted for the other 51 seats. In each
district, the candidate with the largest number of votes was considered to be the
winner.
As the result of the reform, the following territorial and demographic criteria for
delineating electoral districts were set out in the Electoral Code of Moldova:
(a) each district must have at least 55,000 and at most 60,000 voters;
(b) deviation of the number of voters among districts is not allowed to exceed
10%;
(c) if the number of voters of a locality is higher than the average number calcu-
lated for an electoral district then several districts have to be established on
the basis of this locality. Otherwise, setting boundaries of electoral districts
within a locality is prohibited;
(d) districts where national minorities live densely are established, taking into
account the boundaries of the respective localities;
(e) districts on the territory of Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gaˇgaˇuzia are es-
tablished within its boundaries.
The actual districting in 2019 elections. In the elections, 3 districts were asso-
ciated with the Moldovan citizens living abroad (the so-called “diaspora”), 2 districts
were allocated to the Transnistria region, and the rest 46 out of 51 electoral districts
were located on the territory controlled by the Moldovan government. Moldova
was conventionally divided into 5 parts: 1) 9 districts allocated to the capital -
Chişinaˇu City, 2) 2 districts allocated to Chişinaˇu suburbs, 3) 2 districts allocated
to Gaˇgaˇuzia, 4) 1 district allocated to the Bulgarian compact community of Tar-
aclia, 5) the remaining 32 districts (we refer to them as MD32). All the districts
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Figure 1: Floreşti district and its flow (PSRM Maximum map). The flow is obtained
as a part of the solution of the Max-GP problem and it guarantees that the district
is contiguous.
except the ones located in Chisinau were assigned an informal center. The map
corresponding to the actual districting can be accessed on the official web-page of
the Moldovan government [28].
Political parties. In 2019, 15 political forces (14 parties and 1 alliance) partici-
pated in the elections. We considered only four political forces: Democratic Party of
Moldova (PDM), Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), political
alliance ACUM consisting of two parties - Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) and
Dignity and Truth Platform Party (PPDA), and ŞOR party. Other parties did not
succeed in the Parliament.
5.2 Results
In our analysis, we used only publicly available data. We downloaded the results
of the elections in the nation-wide constituency from the official web-page of the
Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Moldova [29].
According to the nation-wide results, the overwhelming majority of votes in
Gaˇgaˇuzia were in favor of PSRM, and other parties under any possible districting
maps have no success there. Likewise, Taraclia was won by PSRM with a large
margin. In Chişinaˇu suburbs, the overwhelming majority of votes belong to ACUM,
and no districting map can give any advantage to other political parties. Thus, we
concentrated on 2 regions: Chişinaˇu City and MD32.
We implemented the integer linear programs for min-GP, max-GP, and fixed-GP
using Python programming language and CPLEX solver (version 12.7). ILP ap-
proaches are not scalable to large instances of the gerrymandering problems, thus
we split MD32 region (32 districts, 838 localities) into 4 parts each having 8 centers:
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1) North, 2) South, 3) West, 4) East. The split was made using the borders of
the actual electoral districting so that it is one of the feasible solutions. To further
speedup the computations, for each district center, we kept only the edges with the
localities whose distance is in top 3 distances from the center. To avoid geograph-
ically unreasonable solutions that are non-compact (i.e, with eel-like shapes), we
used an additional constraint that the total lengths of the borders of the districts
should not exceed the total lengths of the borders of the actual districts. All the
districts in every solution are contiguous (Figure 1).
For each party, we computed the theoretical bounds on the number of won dis-
tricts in the single-district member elections. The lower bound (the minimal value
obtained by solving Min-GP) corresponds to the most pessimistic districting sce-
narios, and there is no possibility to win a smaller number of districts. The upper
bound (the maximum value obtained by solving Max-GP) corresponds to the most
favorable scenarios, and better solutions do not exist. None of the four parties can
lose all its votes due to the manipulation with the district’s boundaries: PSRM wins
at least 12 districts, PDM - 5, ACUM - 6, and ŞOR - 1 (see Figure 2). Also, none
of the parties can win all of the districts due to gerrymandering. In the best sce-
nario for PSRM, it can potentially achieve victory in 29 out of 46 districts. Likewise,
PDM, ACUM, and ŞOR in their most beneficial scenarios win 18, 19, and 3 districts
correspondingly. Examples of the districtings for which each party wins its minimal
and maximal number of districts are shown in Figures 4-11 (see also Supplementary
Table 1).
Next, we identified all feasible electoral outcomes by solving fixed-GP. In total,
out of 511 possible combinations of four numbers with ranges corresponding to
each party’s range and summing up to 46, only 433 are feasible (Figure 3A). Note
that 78 districtings are not feasible due to peculiarities of the distribution of voting
preferences. For example, we found that in the East region, no districting admits
both PSRM and ŞOR to win 3 districts (out of 8).
We projected the results of the nation-wide constituency onto the actual dis-
tricting (Figure 12). In this case, PSRM wins 22 districts, PDM and ACUM each
win 11 districts, and ŞOR wins 2 districts (Figure 2A). Visually, these numbers fall
close to the middle of each party’s range of theoretically possible results. For an
exact answer on who has the highest benefit from this districting, we computed the
efficiency scores. PSRM has the highest efficiency score - 75.5%, followed by ŞOR
with 54.3% and PDM with 40.7%. The most disadvantaged electoral competitor is
ACUM with only a 27.9% efficiency score.
We next identified the outcome of a fair districting (Figure 13). Such a districting
can be characterized by PSRM winning 20 districts, both PDM and ACUM - 12
districts each, and ŞOR - 2 districts (Figure 2B). The efficiency scores, in this case,
would be the following: PSRM - 49.3%, PDM - 57.3%, ACUM - 42.7%, and ŞOR
- 54.3%. The L1 distance of such an outcome to the outcome of the absolutely fair
districting is 19.7, and all other outcomes are less fair (see Supplementary Table 2).
Comparing the outcomes of a fair districting and the actual districting, one can
observe that to make the actual districting fair, it is sufficient to change it in such a
way that PSRM’s outcome be less by 2 districts, but PDM’s and ACUM’s outcomes
be more by 1 district. We found that such an update is possible in the South
region. An example of a fair districting is provided in Figure 13. This districting is
only different from the actual one by assigning 26 localities to different districts, or
11
A) Results of projecting the nation-wide constituency onto the actual partition (46 districts)
Party 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
PSRM
PDM
ACUM
ȘOR
B) Results corresponding to a fair districting (46 districts)
Party 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
PSRM
PDM
ACUM
ȘOR
C) Results computed by the rules of proportional system (46 districts)
Party 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
PSRM
PDM
ACUM
ȘOR
D) Actual single-member district results (45 districts)*
Party 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
PSRM
PDM
ACUM
ȘOR
* - District 43 was won by an independent candidate
Figure 2: The electoral results (black dots) and the theoretical ranges of the number
of won districts for each party.
only around 3% of the total number of localities (in terms of number of registered
voters, it is only 1.6%). To answer the question whether the actual districting can
be considered fair, we sorted all the possible outcomes by the L1 distance of their
efficiency profiles to the efficiency profile of the absolutely fair partition (Figure 3B).
The outcome of the actual partition is 13th in this sorted list (out of 433), i.e., it
is located in the top 3% of all the feasible outcomes. Therefore, we conclude that
despite the fact that PSRM achieves the highest efficiency score among the four
parties, there is no clear evidence for the hypothesis of gerrymandering in favor of
PSRM or any other party.
Also, we sought to showcase that our approach for determining the fair district-
ing is more appropriate and accurate than the one based on the comparison of the
nation-wide results projected onto the actual districting and the electoral outcome
computed by the rules of proportional voting. Parties for which the projected re-
sults are better than the proportional ones are sometimes deemed to gerrymander
the districting map [22]. Conversely, parties that under the actual districting win
fewer districts than they would in the proportional system, are considered to be
the “victims” of gerrymandering. We computed the electoral results of the nation-
wide constituency by following the rules of the proportional system (the “coefficient
method” used in 2019 elections [30]). We excluded from computation the votes
coming from Transnistria and the diaspora and we also excluded the mandates cor-
responding to them. According to this procedure, PSRM would obtain 17 mandates,
PDM - 12, ACUM - 13, and ŞOR - 4 (Figure 2C). Note that in the single-member
district system, ŞOR can never win 4 districts (since the theoretically maximal value
of won districts is 3 for any districting map). Therefore, as in the actual districting
ŞOR wins only 2 districts, it would be incorrectly marked as the “victim” of gerry-
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Figure 3: Visualization of all possible electoral outcomes. A) Each outcome is
presented as an intersection of two lines. Light blue dots are feasible outcomes, and
brown dots are infeasible outcomes. Green lines correspond to the fair outcome, red
lines correspond to the outcome which is furthest from fair, blue lines correspond to
the outcome projected onto the actual districting map. B) All the feasible outcomes
sorted by the L1 distance to the absolutely fair outcome. The three emphasized
outcomes are the same as in A).
mandering. In reality, as its efficiency score is 54.3%, the actual map is neither the
most optimistic, nor the most pessimistic one.
Finally, the real results of the single-district voting are very different from the
nation-wide results projected onto the actual partition (Figure 14). In reality, PSRM
won only 16 districts, PDM surprisingly obtained 17 districts, ACUM - 10, and ŞOR
- 2 (Figure 2D). These results suggest that many voters changed their nation-wide
voting preferences to PDM in their local district. Several studies suggested that due
to their financial and administrative resources, increased control over central and
local authorities (before parliamentary elections PDM had 402 out of a total of 898
mayors [31]), and all-encompassing media support [32], PDM was able to win a large
number of mandates. We are not speculating on the explanation of the real results
since our analysis is only concerned with the problem of gerrymandering. Although
the actual districting was not very beneficial for PDM, it managed to achieve a
striking performance in the single-member voting. PSRM’s efficiency dropped down
to only 7.0%, ACUM’s efficiency was as well poor - 15.7%. ŞOR won its median
number of districts achieving efficiency 54.3%. PDM performed at the astonishing
level of 99.4%.
5.3 Comparison with existing methods for detecting gerry-
mandering
Detecting gerrymandering is a very important mathematical problem with applica-
tions to political sciences and multiple metrics for quantification of gerrymandering
in districting maps have been proposed [33, 34]. One of the most traditional metrics
is the efficiency gap [35, 36]. The efficiency gap is only defined in the case of biparti-
san gerrymandering, and we are not aware of any of its variants that can be directly
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applicable to the case of many parties. Therefore, we contrast our approach with
mean-median difference score (MM) [33] that can be compared with our approach
in a straightforward way. MM score of a party is defined as the difference between
its mean vote share and its median vote share across all the districts in a districting
map. If the MM score is positive than the party is considered to be a victim of
gerrymandering [37].
We can illustrate on a counter-example that MM score is not an appropriate
metric for detecting gerrymandering. Indeed, in the case of the districting map in
Figure 6, PSRM obtains its maximum possible number of mandates. The efficiency
scores are the following: PSRM - 100, PDM - 5.9, ACUM - 0.6, and ŞOR - 54.3 (see
Supplementary Table 2). However, when we compute the MM score for the same
scenario we obtain the following results: PSRM - 0.009, PDM - –0.031, ACUM -
0.005, ŞOR - 0.022. The MM score of PSRM is positive; however, it is unreasonable
to claim that it is a victim of gerrymandering.
6 Conclusion
We present a novel methodology for detecting gerrymandering and computing fair
districting under parallel voting systems. Our methodology is based on identifying
the set of all feasible electoral outcomes by first solving the Minimum and Maximum
Gerrymandering Problems for finding the ranges of possible number of won districts,
and then, identifying all the feasible outcomes by repeated solving of the Fixed
Gerrymandering Problem. We applied our approach to the Moldovan parliamentary
elections of 2019 and positively answered the intriguing question of whether the
actual districting used in the single-member district election was relatively fair.
Importantly, we also provided an example of the most equitable districting map
that does not advantage any of the political parties.
We conclude with several caveats and future directions. First, due to the enor-
mous search space of the gerrymandering problems, it is extremely challenging to
estimate the frequency of each electoral outcome. In our approach, we considered
that each outcome is equally likely. However, the adherents of statistical approaches
to districting would hardly agree with this assumption.
Second, due to the same issue, in the analysis of Moldovan parliamentary elec-
tions, we restricted the search space to only geographically appropriate districting
maps and we split the largest optimization regions into four parts. We acknowledge
that some solutions could potentially be lost. However, we believe that skipping
important solutions is highly unlikely.
Finally, an obvious future direction is to extend our approach to the case when
several parties create different forms of alliances.
References
[1] Richard G Niemi and John Deegan. A theory of political districting. American
Political Science Review, 72(4):1304–1323, 1978.
[2] Justin C Williams. Political redistricting: a review. Papers in Regional Science,
74(1):13–40, 1995.
14
[3] Robert S Garfinkel and George L Nemhauser. Optimal political districting by
implicit enumeration techniques. Management Science, 16(8):B–495, 1970.
[4] Michael E Lewyn. How to limit gerrymandering. Fla. L. Rev., 45:403, 1993.
[5] Charles Backstrom, Leonard Robins, and Scott Eller. Issues in gerrymander-
ing: an exploratory measure of partisan gerrymandering applied to Minnesota.
Minn. L. Rev., 62:1121, 1977.
[6] Anthony J McGann, Charles Anthony Smith, Michael Latner, and Alex Keena.
Gerrymandering in America: The House of Representatives, the Supreme
Court, and the future of popular sovereignty. Cambridge University Press, 2016.
[7] Edmund Malesky. Gerrymandering - Vietnamese style: escaping the partial re-
form equilibrium in a nondemocratic regime. The Journal of Politics, 71(1):132–
159, 2009.
[8] Marián Halás and Pavel Klapka. Functionality versus gerrymandering and na-
tionalism in administrative geography: lessons from Slovakia. Regional Studies,
51(10):1568–1579, 2017.
[9] Benjamin Plener Cover. Quantifying partisan gerrymandering: An evaluation
of the efficiency gap proposal. Stan. L. Rev., 70:1131, 2018.
[10] Ellen Veomett. Efficiency gap, voter turnout, and the efficiency principle. Elec-
tion Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, 17(4):249–263, 2018.
[11] Kristopher Tapp. Measuring Political Gerrymandering. The American Mathe-
matical Monthly, 126(7):593–609, 2019.
[12] Sidney Wayne Hess, JB Weaver, HJ Siegfeldt, JN Whelan, and PA Zitlau. Non-
partisan political redistricting by computer. Operations Research, 13(6):998–
1006, 1965.
[13] Jörg Kalcsics. Districting problems. In Location science, pages 595–622.
Springer, 2015.
[14] Federica Ricca, Andrea Scozzari, and Bruno Simeone. Political districting:
from classical models to recent approaches. Annals of Operations Research,
204(1):271–299, 2013.
[15] Micah Altman. Is automation the answer: The computational complexity of
automated redistricting. Rutgers Computer and Law Technology Journal, 23,
1997.
[16] Bjørn Nygreen. European assembly constituencies for wales-comparing of meth-
ods for solving a political districting problem. Mathematical Programming,
42(1-3):159–169, 1988.
[17] T Nemoto and K Hotta. Modelling and solution of the problem of optimal
electoral districting. Communications of the OR Society of Japan, 48:300–306,
2003.
15
[18] Zhenping Li, Rui-Sheng Wang, and Yong Wang. A quadratic programming
model for political districting problem. In Proceedings of the firsst international
symposium on optimization and system biology (OSB). Bejing, China, 2007.
[19] Mehran Hojati. Optimal political districting. Computers & Operations Re-
search, 23(12):1147–1161, 1996.
[20] Burcin Bozkaya, Erhan Erkut, and Gilbert Laporte. A tabu search heuristic
and adaptive memory procedure for political districting. European Journal of
Operational Research, 144(1):12–26, 2003.
[21] Federica Ricca and Bruno Simeone. Local search algorithms for political dis-
tricting. European Journal of Operational Research, 189(3):1409–1426, 2008.
[22] Gerrymandering 2.0: how were the uninominal constituencies in the Republic
of Moldova drawn? https://watchdog.md/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/
Gerry-Mandering-2.0-eng.pdf. Accessed: 2019-11-26.
[23] Benjamin Fifield, Michael Higgins, Kosuke Imai, and Alexander Tarr. A new
automated redistricting simulator using markov chain monte carlo. Work. Pap.,
Princeton Univ., Princeton, NJ, 2015.
[24] Jowei Chen and David Cottrell. Evaluating partisan gains from Congressional
gerrymandering: Using computer simulations to estimate the effect of gerry-
mandering in the US House. Electoral Studies, 44:329–340, 2016.
[25] Wendy K Tam Cho and Yan Y Liu. Toward a talismanic redistricting tool: A
computational method for identifying extreme redistricting plans. Election Law
Journal, 15(4):351–366, 2016.
[26] Allan Borodin, Omer Lev, Nisarg Shah, and Tyrone Strangway. Big City vs.
the Great Outdoors: Voter Distribution and How It Affects Gerrymandering.
In IJCAI, pages 98–104, 2018.
[27] The Gerrymandering Project. https://fivethirtyeight.com/tag/
the-gerrymandering-project/. Accessed: 2019-12-22.
[28] Harta circumscriptiilor uninominale. https://gov.md/ro/content/
/harta-circumscriptiilor-uninominale-prezentata-spre-aprobare-guvernului.
[29] Comisia Electorala Centrala a Republicii Moldova. https://a.cec.md/ro/
rezultate-alegeri-4287.html. Accessed: 2019-12-22.
[30] The Electoral Code of Moldova (12/30/2018 version). https://www.legis.
md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=111378&lang=ro. Accessed: 2019-12-22.
[31] Mihai Mogildea and Diana Kralova. Between Theory and Practice: Pos-
sible outcomes of the Parliamentary Elections in Moldova under the
mixed electoral system. http://ipre.md/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/
Research-Paper-Possible-scenarios-for-the-parliamentary-elections.
pdf, 2018. Accessed: 2019-12-9.
16
[32] ODIHR final report on Moldova’s parliamentary elections of
24 February 2019. http://www.epgencms.europarl.europa.
eu/cmsdata/upload/3722ab72-5ca4-4de2-aaa3-e04a62c2799f/
Moldove-parliamentary-elections__24-Feb-2019-OSCE_final_report.
pdf, 2019. Accessed: 2019-12-9.
[33] Gregory S Warrington. A comparison of partisan-gerrymandering measures.
Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, 18(3):262–281, 2019.
[34] Moon Duchin. Gerrymandering metrics: How to measure? what’s the baseline?
arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.02064, 2018.
[35] Eric McGhee. Measuring partisan bias in single-member district electoral sys-
tems. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 39(1):55–85, 2014.
[36] Nicholas O Stephanopoulos and Eric M McGhee. Partisan gerrymandering and
the efficiency gap. U. Chi. L. Rev., 82:831, 2015.
[37] Nicholas O Stephanopoulos and Eric M McGhee. The measure of a metric: The
debate over quantifying partisan gerrymandering. Stan. L. Rev., 70:1503, 2018.
17
Figure 4: A maximum scenario for ACUM.
Figure 5: A minimum scenario for ACUM.
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Figure 6: A maximum scenario for PSRM.
Figure 7: A minimum scenario for PSRM.
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Figure 8: A maximum scenario for PDM.
Figure 9: A minimum scenario for PDM.
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Figure 10: A maximum scenario for ŞOR.
Figure 11: A minimum scenario for ŞOR.
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Figure 12: The results of the nation-wide constituency projected onto the actual
districting map.
Figure 13: A fair districting map.
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Figure 14: The actual results of the single-member district voting.
23
